In a bold move reminiscent of gunboat diplomacy, French President Pompidou ordered a warship to slip into New York City’s harbor in August 1971. Its mission? To retrieve France’s gold reserves stored in the vaults of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and transport them back to Paris. This maneuver wasn’t just about safeguarding assets; it was a clear statement of intent, echoing the sentiments of Pompidou’s predecessor, Charles de Gaulle.
Based on the information provided, it appears that the French warship involved in transporting gold from New York City to France in 1971 was likely a destroyer rather than a battleship. However, pinpointing the exact ship was challenging due to limited available online records, but french new papers gave more details.
Who was the French Warship sent to USA in 1971?
In the context of the time frame and the task at hand, it’s plausible that the French warship could have been a T47-class, a T53-class, or a Suffren-class destroyer. Regarding the suggestion of sending the cruiser Colbert to pick up the gold, while it’s mentioned in an interview with the 1965 Finance Minister that de Gaulle proposed this idea, it’s uncertain whether it was actually executed. The lack of definitive evidence adds to the mystery surrounding the identity of the French warship involved in the gold transfer.
Aa decommissioned warship, the French cruiser Ocean.
The vessel known as the “Océan” was originally a French cruiser named the “Suffren.” Converted to an instruction ship, she was tasked with carrying four smaller boats for transporting cadets between the ship and the mainland, a feature that made her particularly suitable for discreet missions, such as transporting valuable cargo, including gold.
In France, instruction ships, even if seaworthy, are typically excluded from official lists of active ships, which helps explain the scarcity of information in English-language sources. However, French publications and naval histories do document which vessels took part in the mission. Mentions of Océan do appear in some French newspapers of the period, though comprehensive online records are limited.
Ocean Ex Suffren in 1931.
The Suffren.
The vessel, initially named the “Suffren,” was a heavy cruiser of the Suffren class in the French Navy, named in honor of Vice-Admiral Pierre André de Suffren. In early June 1940, along with other cruisers—Duquesne, Tourville, and Duguay-Trouin—and three destroyers, the Suffren participated in Operation Vado, a retaliation against Italy after its declaration of war on France on June 10, 1940. Later that month, Suffren undertook a joint operation with the Royal Navy, marking the last collaboration before the Armistice.
When the Armistice was signed on June 22, 1940, Suffren was stationed in Alexandria, Egypt, alongside other French warships. Unlike the standoff at Mers el-Kébir, the British and French admirals, Cunningham and Godfroy, reached an agreement, allowing the French ships to be interned under British control. On July 3, 1940, Suffren was stripped of fuel and ammunition but later rejoined the Allied forces after being rearmed and modernized on May 30, 1943.
In 1963, Suffren was renamed Océan and repurposed as an instruction ship, moored in Toulon since 1947. In 1971, she was modified as an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) instruction ship and returned to seaworthy status, with Saint-Mandrier-sur-Mer as her homeport. As a training vessel, she carried four smaller boats for cadet transport to and from the mainland, making her well-suited for specific logistical tasks, such as transporting valuable cargo like gold from New York to France.
Why the Ocean War Ship was sent to the US?
De Gaulle, known for his outspoken criticism of US foreign policy, had set the stage for such a move. He was vehemently opposed to the dominance of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency, famously declaring it an instrument favoring only one nation. His skepticism was evident in his remarks as far back as February 4, 1965, where he expressed doubts about the dollar’s impartiality and suitability as an international trade medium.
The events of August 1971 marked a turning point. Following France’s retrieval of its gold, other nations began to reassess their positions. The British, in particular, requested the relocation of their gold reserves from Fort Knox to the New York Federal Reserve Bank, signaling a loss of confidence in the existing system. Paul Volcker, then treasury undersecretary for monetary affairs, succinctly captured the significance of these actions, noting that if the British were withdrawing gold for their dollars, it signaled the end of an era.
On August 15, 1971, when President Nixon addressed the nation, the US gold reserves had dwindled to less than 10,000 tons, less than half of what they once were. With the value of the dollar now floating against other major currencies, the Bretton Woods system, which had anchored the global monetary order since World War II, was effectively dismantled. While this move relieved the pressure on the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency, it also removed the earlier constraints that encouraged responsible financial management. In August 1971, the price of gold experienced significant changes due to historical events. The price of gold began to greatly increase after the Nixon shock on August 15, 1971.
Pompidou’s deployment of a warship to retrieve France’s gold reserves from New York City’s shores stands as a symbol of the shifting tides in global economics and diplomacy. It was a decisive act that underscored the growing disillusionment with established monetary systems and set the stage for a new era of financial uncertainty and realignment.
While the US dollar continues to reign as the global reserve currency, fissures in the system are becoming increasingly apparent. Questions loom over how long countries like China and Japan will continue to fund our yearly deficits. As the Federal Reserve’s policy of near-zero interest rates nears its end, the specter of financing nearly $17 trillion in debt looms large. Moreover, the staggering unfunded obligations, estimated between $70 trillion by former US Comptroller General David Walker and $200 trillion by Boston University’s Larry Kotlikoff, present a destabilizing and unsustainable trajectory. Despite these glaring challenges, our political leaders seem paralyzed, navigating from one short-term fix to another amid shutdown fights and debt-ceiling deadlines.
The Bretton Woods system, with its fixed exchange rates pegged to gold, once imposed much-needed discipline. Now, the pressing question is whether today’s leaders possess the attention span, depth, policy acumen, and political will to craft a successor to Bretton Woods. Some suggest the International Monetary Fund could facilitate a new international reserve currency or advocate for a weighted “market basket” of currencies to supplant the US dollar, a notion already championed by countries like China. Whatever form the new system takes, it’s evident that change is imperative to mitigate the destabilizing trends of the past four decades.
One such destabilizing factor is the accumulation of global trade imbalances, particularly between the United States and China, which sporadically sparks disputes. The US accuses China of currency manipulation, while China admonishes the US to address its structural deficit and live within its means. The phrase “exorbitant privilege,” often attributed to de Gaulle, highlights the considerable advantages the US enjoyed under the Bretton Woods system. While historians debate whether de Gaulle or his Minister of Finance, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, first uttered the phrase publicly, its resonance persists.
The “Nixon Shock” of August 15, 1971, marked the definitive end of the Bretton Woods era, severing the last vestiges of the dollar’s link to gold and ushering in the era of fiat currencies. With the dollar allowed to float against other major currencies, the sense of imposed responsibility enshrined in the Bretton Woods Agreement dissipated.
Despite the historical backdrop, recent events echo past narratives. Austria, reminiscent of France’s move in 1971, has requested the repatriation of over 90 tons of its gold from the Bank of England’s vaults. This request follows Germany’s similar plea to the US Federal Reserve a few years ago. However, the Fed’s response was far from accommodating, refusing not only to repatriate Germany’s 300 tons of gold but also to permit an audit of its own vaults. The delay tactic employed by the Fed, promising action by “at least 2020,” left many Germans disillusioned, pondering whether their government should reconsider its banking relationships.
These episodes serve as poignant reminders of the complexities and vulnerabilities embedded in the global financial system. As nations assert their sovereignty over their reserves and navigate shifting geopolitical landscapes, the quest for stability and transparency in international finance remains ongoing.